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THE CIVIL COURTS AND THE CHURCHES.
It is the purpose of this study to try to ascertain certain
principles that govern in the administration of the law in
relation to religious bodies. There will be no attempt to
include all of the many cases found in the books, but leading
ones will be used, as well as others not so well known but
believed to be valuable, and some extracts from judicial
opinions will be given.
Three familiar historical periods or conditions come to
the mind of an American lawyer who considers the present
subject.
The first is the unlimited claim of the church to supremacy
in Europe before the Reformation. This may be seen with
speedy vision by one reference to the text of the Corpus
Juris Canonici as follows: "Perhaps the most frequently
cited canon on the subject is the cap. Ecclesiae Sanctae Maria
or Decretal. lib. I, tit. 2, cap. IO, which dates from i19.

It declares that every lay statute affecting churches, whether
favorably or unfavorably, is of no strength, unless approved
by the church, nullius firmitatis existit, nisi ab ecclesia fuerit
approbatum. It also declares that there can be attributed to
laymen no faculty over churches and ecclesiastical persons
26
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as to whom laymen must have the necessity of obeying, not
the authority of commanding; quod laicis (etiam religiosis)
super ecclesiis et personis ecclesiasticis nulla sit attributa
facultas: quos obsequendi inanet necessitas non auctoritas
imperandi." *
The second conception is the change wrought in England
in the reign of Henry VIII. It was then enacted by authority of Parliament, "that the King our sovereign lord, his
heirs and successors, Kings of this realm, shall be taken,
accepted and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the
Church of England, called Anglicana Ecclesia * * *
and have full power to correct all heresies and offences. 26
Hen. VIII. c. i. (A.D. 1534). This declaration was repealed
by the Act of i and 2 Ph. & M. c. 8, but revived by t Eliz.
c. I and 5 Eliz. c. i.
To use Mr. Anson's words, "the church was built into
the fabric of the state." He reduces the constitutional
change to three heads, viz.: (I) The recognition of the
ultimate judicial power of the Crown; (2) The recognition
of the legislative subordination of the clergy; (3) The
sanction given by Parliament to the Liturgy and Articles
of Religion as formulated by Convocations.t
Thus questions of theology and cases of heresy were
under the jurisdiction of judges appointed by the sovereign.
The third and even more frequent reflection is the absolute absence in America of governmental authority in
matters of religious faith and practice.
After the struggle of the Revolution, achieved by the
courage, the patriotism, the patience of the people of the
thirteen colonies, had ended with the triumphant and
acknowledged severance of allegiance to the King, there
came the need of ordained organic law. This was effected
by the Federal Convention in 1787. Men of varied abilities
and diverse views, but some of them deeply thoughtful and
happily with genius for leadership, and all with sincere love
* Copied from that treasury of

research and thought, "Judicial

Power and Unconstitutional Legislation," by the late Brinton Coxe
(completed by Wm.M. Meigs) p. 127.
t Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution, Vol. II p. 4Ol.
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of country, composed the membership. After debates and
compromises there was evolved that product of toil and
thought and noble purpose which stands alone as a monument of constructive statesmanship. From the stately porch
and vestibule of the Preamble through its divisions of legislative, executive and judicial powers to its wings and dome
of reciprocal recognition of state by state and its averment of
national integrity, it has been the admiration of the civilized
world. It has sustained in unimpaired strength and symmetry the test and strain of criticism, argument and interpretation, and also the storms of war.
Yet the work of wise men was not perfect and its ratification was accomplished only through contests and discussions in the respective states. When the first Congress met
eleven had accepted the Constitution and two had not. The
last to ratify was the State of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations on May 29, 179o, but she enjoined upon her
senators and representatives to use all their influence to
obtain the adoption by Congress of twenty-one amendments
which were specified and attached to the act of ratification.
A copy of this action was transmitted to each house on the
I6th of June. There were subsequent resolutions, with
suggestions and considerations of various changes and additions to the Constitution, but the final outcome was the
resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives proposing twelve articles to the legislatures of the several states
as amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
This was passed on the 25th of September, 1789, and ten
of the articles were afterwards ratified by the requisite number of states, the last being Virginia on December 15, 1791.
The first and the only one of the amendments with which
the present study is concerned was the clause at the beginning of Article I. It is in clear and absolute terms that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Thus the
whole power over the subject of religion was left to the state
governments, and from time to time a similar guarantee
has been established by the Constitutions of the respective
commonwealths and religious liberty is the law of the land.

-
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In the earlier days of the colonies some who claimed this

freedom for themselves failed to see and admit that others
were equally entitled to it; but in time the power to coerce
men into religious professions or to subject them to ecclesi-

astical rule was destroyed. The theocracy of New England,
the Quakerism of Pennsylvania, the liberal Catholicism of
Maryland, the Calvinism of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians in
the middle parts of the country, the loyalty to Episcopacy
in Virginia and the Carolinas,-in brief, the opinions of
men of all creeds, and of no creed, were absolved from legal
obligation to the tenets or forms or regulations of any
established church. Subject to civic obligations and to the
reserved rights of the states, the franchise of unfettered worship of Almighty God according to the individual conscience
of each believer was secured in perpetuity.
This fundamental law is fully expressed in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, Art. i, Sec. 3: "All men have a
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man
can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his
consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship." Similar provisions are in
all or nearly all of the state constitutions.
The effect is that every resident and every man who
comes to this land of free asylum is legally at liberty to
believe and to practise his belief, but not to interfere with
the right of others to the same unrestrained choice of faith
and conduct. Further, however, as was said by Mr. Justice
Miller in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, on p. 714, and he
states in substance the declaration of other courts: "Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as
other voluntary associations for benevolent and charitable
purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are
equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of
their members subject to its restraint." The like thought
was expressed by Lowrie, C. J., in McGinnis v. Watson, 41
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Pa. 9, on p. 14, when, after referring to the Constitution
of the Commonwealth, he said: "Of course this law was not
intended to exempt any. religious society from the respect
that is due to the organization and moral and social order
of the state, or from the necessity of holding its land under
the state, and according to its laws." These two quotations
need not be reinforced. The statements are not contradicted
by any authorities.
From this general view the point of research at once is
presented: Upon what grounds have civil tribunals deemed
it their duty to take jurisdiction over religious bodies in
regard to rights of property or of officers or members?
Primarily, and notwithstanding the constitutional differences between the two countries, the enforcement of trusts
is found to be clearly within the power of the courts both
in England and in the United States. Apart from the
circumstances of any particular case the general rule may be
readily shown. When the expressions of judges summarize
the principles on which their conclusions are based it is fair
to give such fundamental thoughts without details of the
facts of the suits in which they were declared, except where
those facts are essential to an understanding of the law.
Out of the great number of cases only a few will be selected.
The following is an excerpt from the opinion of Lord
Davey in the celebrated cases, General Assembly v. Overtoun and others and Macatisterv. Young, Law Reports i9o4,
Appeal Cases 515 (hereinafter stated more fully). He said,
p. 644: "My lords, I disclaim altogether any right in this
or any other civil court of this realm to discuss the truth or
reasonableness of any of the doctrines of this or any other
religious association, or to say whether any of them are or
are not based on a just interpretation of the language of
Scripture, or whether the contradictions or antinomies between different statements of doctrine are or are not real or
apparent only, or whether such contradictions do or do not
proceed only from an imperfect and finite conception of a
perfect and infinite Being, or any similar question. The
more -humble, but not useless, function of the Civil Court is
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to determine whether the trusts imposed upon the property
by the founders of the trust are being duly observed."
In Watson v. Jones, supra, at p. 723, it is said by Miller,
J.:"* * * It seems hardly to admit of a rational doubt
that an individual or an association of individuals may dedicate property by way of trust to the purpose of sustaining,
supporting and propagating definite religious doctrines or
principles, provided that in doing so they violate no law of
morality, and give to the instrument by which their purpose
is evidenced, the formalities which the laws require. And
it would seem also to be the obvious, duty of the court, in a
case properly made, to see that the property so dedicated is
not diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its use."
The simplest idea of a trust is "a confidence reposed in
some other . . . ." *
A voluminous explanation of this indisputable control by
the civil courts is to be found in the opinion of Judge Allison
of Court of Common Pleas No. i, Philadelphia, in Jones v.
Wadsworth, 4 W. N. C. 514. To those who had the privilege of arguing before him and who recall his courteous
attention, patience and painstaking study and deliberation,
followed by accuracy of decision, no apology is required for
the ' following long extract which may well terminate this
part of our subject. He said:
"A trust, in strict technical sense, is an obligation arising out of
confidence reposed to apply property according to such confidence.
It may be expressed or implied; and it is implied when deducible
from the transaction as matter of intent, or when the law attaches to
such transaction the incidents of a trust. There must be sufficient
words to raise a trust; a definite property, which becomes subject
to it, and an ascertained purpose to be accomplished. A trust once
established for a lawful purpose becomes 'the child of the law, and
more especially the ward of chancery;' not only for defence, but for
oversight and guardianship, which is never suspended. If there is an
attempt to carry it away or pervert it, the law seeks it out, and
restores it to its true position; and when, for this purpose, the
remedy at law fails for want of sufficient power, the jurisdiction of
equity begins. And this is because a trust is born of confidence. It is
the pledge which society gives that the intentions of the dead as well
as of the living shall be sacredly maintained. Against a trust time
* See i Lewin on Trusts, chap. I, *13, citing Lord Coke's definition

of a use before the statute of uses.
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does not run, except to add to its sanctity, and as long as government
exists, and the law maintains its supremacy, no power can overthrow
or destroy a trust. It can only be when the object for which it was
originated becomes 'extinct; or when there is no one entitled to
partake of its benefits; or when it becomes the property of creditors
in payment of its debts. These principles, in their strongest sense, apply
to all cases of charitable use, and .property vested in a religious
society is a charitable use, clothed with all the rights and incidents
and powers of a trust. The first question to be considered, when a
complaint is made that a trust has been violated and the existence of the trust or charitable use is not denied, is, what are the
essential elements of the trust, and by what form, or in what manner, has the founder decreed that it shall be administered? These
things once ascertained, it is the duty of courts to carry them
into effect, to see that the conditions of the trust, whether they relate
to the more essential interests, which are designed to be advanced
and perpetuated, or to the manner of its administration, are with
all fidelity carried into effect.
"The tribunals of law and of equity cannot pause to inquire whether,
in their judgment, the founders of the trust have done wisely in
prescribing the laws which give direction to it, or in directing the garb
in which it shall be clothed, or the order to which it shall for all
time adhere; these may have had their origin in mere caprice or
prejudice, but in the mind of the donors or founders of a trust they
are often regarded as of the first importance, as vitally connected
with the higher interests which they seek to promote, and as securing,
better than could be secured in any other way, the execution of the
trust, and thus the form and the substance are alike made essential
portiops of it."

It thus appears that the jurisdiction based upon trusts is
settled. The statements of facts and law are frequently
voluminous but from the weight of authority in cases of the
enforcement of trusts it is believed that four propositions
may be deduced.
I. That although the courts will not inquire into or decide
what religious tenets or doctrines are true or false, yet when
it becomes necessary in order to see that a trust or charity
is administered according to the intention of its founders
such inquiry and decision will be made as may give effect
to that intention.
2. That for a like purpose the meaning of the name and
organization of a religious body will be determined and
enforced.
3. That both doctrine and organization may be considered.
4. That in case of a division or schism those (or that
faction or fraction) adhering to the laws, usages, doctrines
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and customs as adopted by the body before the separation
will be recognized in questions as to title to church property.
Clearly cut separate illustrations of the two theories first
stated are not numerous, but in many cases the two several
points of doctrine and of organization or sectarian status
are found to coalesce or to overlap. Organizations have
generally been created in order to maintain or promulgate
tenets. Yet instances of each, severally, may be found.
First then as to matters of doctrine some notable suits
are found in the books. In the effort to be concise there
is a risk of erroneous analysis and summary in citing these
cases and indulgence for mistakes is asked. Conspicuous
among all is the opinion of Lord Eldon in Attorney General v. Pearson, 3 Merivale 353 (1817). It is important
and leading. It is cited and followed in a series of English
cases and has been approved many times by American
judges. It has also been criticised on this side of the Atlantic by those who may rightly be called jurists, but it is herein
referred to as authority for the position thus formulated,
to wit: The will of the founder of a trust is to be observed.
If expressed in the deed it is to be therein primarily ascertained. If expressed in doubtful or general words recourse
must be had to extrinsic circumstances, such as the known
opinions of the founder, the existing state of the law, and
the contemporaneous usage. To show these parol evidence
may be received and considered.
Pursuing the examination further, we notice that this
was a case arising out of a dispute concerning the rights
of the minister and congregation of a dissenting meetinghouse. The acting trustees by a majority had commenced
a suit to eject the minister (Rev. J. Steward), and the
minister and a person claiming to be the surviving trustee
sought by information and bill in chancery to obtain an
injunction to restrain the ejectment, and a declaration that
the minister was entitled to receive the annual income of the
trust premises and that he might be quieted in his office
of minister and in the use of the meeting-house.
The original deed of trust made in i7oi relating to the
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foundation was to the expressed intent that the house built
upon the granted land was to be for "a meeting-house for
the worship and service of God." By a deed of I72O a
grant of an acre of land was made to trustees to permit the
rents, etc., to be received by A. (the then minister) during
his life and after his decease "by the minister for the time
being who should be the stated and settled minister of the
congregation or society of Dissenting Protestants belonging
to the said meeting-house," towards the support and maintenance of such minister forever. The pleadings contained
lengthy statements of the disputes which had taken place,
as to the election of trustees and in regard to the doctrines
preached by the minister whom it was sought to eject.
The plaintiffs contended, in brief, that the intention of
the donor was to promote the belief or doctrine of the Holy
Trinity, that the defendants were Unitarians, opposed to
Trinitarianism, and that the meeting-house and trust premises had been diverted from the trust. The answer denied
the original purpose of the trust as alleged, and stated that
Steward had been invited to become minister for three years
on his profession of tenets in accordance with those approved
by the congregation, and that he afterwards changed these
tenets and preached doctrines objectionable to the congregation and that he insisted, against the will of the congregation and of the trustees, in holding the position of minister after the expiration of the three years.
There was a question whether under the law, as it existed
at the time of the foundation, a trust for the maintenance of
a religious teaching which denied the doctrine of the Trinity
could be regarded as lawful; but this is outside of the scope
of the present essay.
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Eldon) passing that question,
stated this:
* * What I have now to inquire is whether the deed creating
the trust does or, does not, upon the face of it (regard being had
to that which the Toleration Act at the time of its execution permitted or forbadewith respect to doctrine),bear a decided manifestation
that the doctrines intended by that deed to be inculcated in this chapel
were Trinitarian?- Because, if that were originally the case, and if

any number of the trustees are now seeking to fasten on this institution the promulgation of doctrines contrary to those which, it is thus
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manifest, were intended by the founders, I apprehend that they are
seeking to do that which they have no power to do, and which neither
they, nor any other members of the congregation, can call upon a single
remaining trustee to effectuate."

Afterwards, on finally disposing of the motion, he said:
"From this deed I can collect that the founders were Protestant
Dissenters, and thence presume that their object was the maintenance
of Protestant Dissenting worship; but I have nothing to inform me
what species of doctrine this institution was intended to -maintain;
except as I may be able to infer from some of the clauses of the deed,
and particularly from that clause which alludes to the possibility
of the future prohibition by law of the worship thereby -intended to
be established, and also from that which relates to the binding effect
of orders to be made by a majority of the Trustees upon matters
relating to the meeting-house onty; from which it should appear, both
that the founders meant to establish an institution which was not
then contrary to law, and that they did not mean to invest in the
Trustees, or the major part of them, any right to vary the system
or plan of doctrinal teaching which was to be maintained in this
meeting-house according to their own discretion."

His Lordship then read the deed of 172o and discussed
the other questions in the case and granted an injunction
'till the further order of the court. The case was referred
to a master who was to inquire what was the nature and
particular object with respect to worship and doctrine for
the observance, teaching and support of which each of the
funds or estates was created.
This case stands the principal one, and in it is found
Lord Eldon's statement, "that if any person seeking the
benefit of a trust for charitable purposes should incline to
the adoption of a different system from that which was
intended by the original donors and founders; and if others
of those who are interested think proper to adhere to the
original system, the leaning of the court must be to support
those adhering to the original system and not to sacrifice
the original system to any change of sentiment in the persons
seeking alteration, however commendable that proposed
alteration may be."
Notwithstanding the criticism of Lord Eldon by jurists
on the ground of a right to change doctrines and of religious
liberty as Chancellor Walworth expressed himself in Baptist
Ch.v. Witherell, 3 Paige 296, or as Ch. J. Williams did in
Smith v. Nelson, I8 Vt. 5"1, and as Judge Doe did in Hale
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v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9, or as Justice Miller did under his
third class of cases,-i.e., of property held by an independent
congregation, on page 724 of 13 Wallace in Watson v.

Jones, it may confidently be averred that, qua trusts, Atty.
Gen. v. Pearsonis widely cited and relied on as authoritative
in the majority of American opinions.
An oft-cited case is Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & Fin. 355.
The history need not be set out or recital of opinions made
except to such an extent as may be germane to the present
topic. The final hearing was on an appeal to the House
of Lords. The decision depended upon the construction of
certain deeds of trust for charities made by Lady Hewley
in which were the terms, "godly preachers of Christ's holy
gospel," "godly persons," and others therein used. The
common law judges were called and among other questions
submitted to them was: First, Whether the extrinsic evidence adduced in the cause, or what part of it, was admissible for the purpose of determining who were entitled under
the above words?
There was a diversity in the views* of the seven judges on
different points, but it was said by Lord Cottenham in
moving the judgment of the House that it did not appear
to him necessary to consider minutely these differences. He
did however approve of the opinion of Mr. Baron Gurney
that that part of the evidence which went to show the existence of a religious party by which the phraseology found in
the deeds was used, and the manner in which it was used,
and that Lady Hewley was a member of that party was
admissible; that being in effect no more than receiving
evidence of the circumstances by which the author of the
instrument was surrounded at the time.
It was held that neither Unitarians nor members of the
Church of England, but Protestant Dissenters only, were
entitled to the benefit of the charities.
The momentous decision on August I, 1904, in two

appeals from the Second Division of the Court of Session
to the House of Lords under two captions Free Church of
*"

Obscure" ?

See sec. 2467 Wigmore, Evidence; note.
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Scotland (General Assembly of) v. Overtoun and Macalister v. Young, Law Reports 19o4, App. Cases 515, seems

on first impression so severe, so opposed to all our love of
religious liberty, so contrary to the spirit of unity, so wasteful of great material resources for Christian worship and
usefulness, that it is difficult to read the report of the facts
and the conclusions of law in the case with a calm and
restrained mind. The results reached by the high tribunal

nullified the will of the vastly preponderating majority of
those who by birth, training and conscientious conviction
had the deepest interest in the welfare of the two great
organizations that were affected by the union of the Free
Church of Scotland and the United Presbyterian Church in
i9oo. In the Free Church the union had been approved
by a majority of 643 against 27 in the Free Church Assembly, the Supreme Court of the Church. In the United
Presbyterian Church the union was agreed to unanimously.
A small number of ministers (24 out of Iioo) and a larger
number of laymen-that is, office-bearers and members, most
of them resident in the Highlands,-disapproved of the
union and refused to enter the United Free Church. They
were the appellants and pursuers in the first appeal. It will
answer our purpose to consider only that appeal. They
claimed that they and those who adhered to them alone
represented the Free Church of Scotland and were alone
entitled to the whole funds and property of the Free Church
which were held for behoof of the church by its general
trustees, who were the respondents in the action, namely,
Lord Overtoun and others. This appeal was concerned
solely with the property of the church as a whole.
The syllabus of the case is carefully prepared. An effort
to change it would be futile. It is as follows:
"The identity of a religious community described as a Church
consists in the identity of its doctrines, creeds, confessions, formularies
and tests.
"The bond of union of a Christian association may contain a power
in some recognized body to control, alter, or modify the tenets or
principles at one time professed by the association; but the existence
of such a power must be proved.
"The denomination of Christians which called itself the Free Church
of Scotland was founded in 1843. It consisted of ministers and laity
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who seceded from the Established Church of Scotland, but who
rofessed to carry with them the doctrine and system of the Established
urch, only freeing themselves by secession from what they regarded
as interference by the State in matters spiritual. Two main fundamental doctrines which the appellants, the minority of the Free
Church, asserted that the seceders in 1843 carried with them and
issued in their Claim, Declaration and Protest to their supporters and
benefactors in that year to stand for all time were the Establishment
principle, and the unqualified acceptance of the Westminster Confession of Faith, and they further asserted that these doctrines were
part of the constitution of the Church and could not be altered.
In 1843 and subsequent years the response to the appeal for funds was
most bountiful, and the Free Church was endowed by the liberality of
its members, the property being secured under what was called a
"Model Trust Deed." For many years efforts had been made to
bring about a union between the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church, also seceders from the Established Church, but a
church pledged to disestablishment. In i9oo Acts of Assembly were
passed by the majority of the Free Church and unanimously by the
United Presbyterian Church for union, under the name of the United
Free Church, and the Free Church property was conveyed to new
trustees for behoof of the new church. The United Presbyterian
Church was opposed to the Establishment principle, and did not
maintain the Westminster Confession of Faith in its entirety. The Act
of Union left ministers and laymen free to hold opinions as regards the
Establishment principle and the predestination doctrine (in the Westminster Confession) as they pleased. The respondents contended that
the Free Church had full power to change its doctrines so long
as its identity was preserved. The appellants, a very small minority
of the 'Free Church, objected to the union, maintaining that the
Free Church had no power to change its original doctrines, or to
unite with a body which did not confess those doctrines, and they
complained of a breach of trust inasmuch as the property of the
Free Church was no longer being used for behoof'of that Church.
And they brought this action in the name of the General Assembly
of the Free Church, asking substantially for a declarator that they,
as representing the Free Church, were entitled to the property:
"HEa,
reversing the decision of the Second Division of the Court
of Session (Lords Macnaghten and Lindley dissenting), that the
Establishment principle and the Westminster Confession were distinctive tenets of the Free Church; that the Free Church had no
power, where property was concerned, to alter or vary the doctrine
of the Church; that there was no true union, as the United Free Church
had not preserved its identity with the Free Church, not having the
same distinctive tenets; and that the appellants were entitled to
hold for behoof of the Free Church the property held by the Free
Church before the union of igoo.
"By Lord Macnaghten: (1) That the Free Church when it came
into existence claimed the power of altering and amending its Confesajon of Faith, and accordingly could declare the Establishment
principle an open question, and could relax the stringency of the
formula required from ministers and others; (2) That provision for
expansion and development was part aid parcel of the original trust
under which the Free Church funds had been collected, and that there
had been no breach of trust.
"By Lord Lindley: That any interpretation of the Scripture or of
the subordinate standards bona fide adopted by the General Assembly
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of the Free Church, and held by them better to express the doctrine
intended to be expressed by the language used in the Confession, was
not beyond the power of the Free Church, and that there was no
breach of trust."

There were two hearings, the last on June 9, 10, 13,
14, I6, 17, 20, 21, 23, 19o4, before the Earl of Halsbury,
L. C. and Lords Macnaghten, Davey, James of Hereford,
Robertson, Lindley and Alverstone, C. J.
From the conclusion stated in the syllabus only two dissented, but opinions reversing the court below were rendered
by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Davey, Lord James, Lord
Robertson and Lord Alverstone, C. J.
The union of the two churches had been overwhelmingly
approved by many Scotch ministers and laymen, who by
inheritance, by education, and by keen intelligence were
intellectually as well as conscientiously tenacious of Calvinistic orthodoxy, and further the Scottish Court had sustained the union and, still further, two members of the Court
of final resort deemed the union lawful. The reader regards
with wonder not the protracted arguments, but the judicial
firmness which determined the question what were the religious tenets which formed the bond of union of the association for whose benefit the trust was created. It is only by
prolonged examination that the appendices to the Report
of the Appeals, Statutes, Acts of Assembly (e.g., Confession, Discipline, etc., etc.) can be studied.
There lingers in the mind of the reader a regret that the
two opinions which, (while concurring in the legal propositions established by prior decisions), held that the General
Assemblies of the Free Church had power to relax those
fetters which the majority of the Law Lords deemed hard
and fast, did not prevail. The grave results of the determination of the alleged breach of trust had no weight. The
law was applied and the case will stand as a leading example
in the administration of law. The rights of a minority in
number and in influence were declared and enforced. We
may differ, we may deplore, we may feel indignant, but the
law as construed in its application to doctrines, creeds,
formularies and tests was declared without excuse or sign of
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wavering and the majority opinions were not influenced by
dread of the effects which were so far-reaching and, to many
minds, sadly disastrous. Surely no one can fail to see in
this case a marked example of judicial courage.
The following is part of a quotation found in the opinion
of the Lord Chancellor, at p. 616, and as an example of
clear rhetorical expression it is inserted herein:
" * * * And thirdly, we do not coerce our neighbor by calling
for his signature to our profession or articles of faith. We leave him
free to adopt or to repudiate that faith, according as his reason, his
conscience, and the grace of God may direct him. We but say to him,
If you agree with us affix your signature to certain articles, or in some
way notify your recognition of their truth; or if you disagree,
withhold such signature or declaration. And we say of him, in the
former case that he is and in the latter case that he is not of our
religion. We do not compel him to hold our faith; but we ask
him to inform us, by certain acts, whether he does hold it or does not;
and we ask this, only if he claim to be enrolled as one of our body,
and to be in religious communion with us. In the absence of such
a test, our establishment would not be a rock, cemented into solidity
by harmonious uniformity of opinion, it would be a mere incongruous
heap of, as it were, grains of sand, thrown together without being
united, each of these intellectual and isolated grains differing from
every other, and the whole forming a but nominally united while
really aiconnected mass, fraught with nothing but internal dissimilitude,
and mttual and reciprocal contradiction and dissension. Hic dextrorsm abit; ille zinistrorsum.
"This indeed, I should hold to be, in the language of a late prelate,
'a church without a religion."' Smith, B. in Dill v. Watson (x836) 2
Jones Rep. (Ir. Ex.) 48, 91.

Some American examples of trusts may now be given.
The case of Hale v. Everett, 53 New Hampshire 9
(1868), is remarkable for the long opinions of Sargent, J.,
who represented the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court
and of Doe, J., dissenting. The first covers 84 pages and
the other 15o pages. The citations are so numerous that
they may serve for a digest up to the date of the decree.
The discussions in these elaborate essays cover a wide
range upon the Bill of Rights, Constitution and Statutes
of the State,* and upon the law as to religious names, sects
and doctrines. The dissent of that distinguished lawyer
who stood alone in his conclusions is marked by his wonted
virile mental grasp and power of verbal utterance. It is
* The treatment of the Constitutional and Statutory Law of the State
of New Hampshire is not deemed material here.
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proof of great study of works on theology as well as law.
The tenor of his able, learned and, at times, original arguments appears to be opposition to all action by the court on
questions of doctrine and a strenuous demand for the right
to change opinions and for what he deemed religious liberty.
No brief synopsis can do justice to the extended opinions
found in the report of the case. They probably contain the
fullest judicial discussion of the subjects involved that has
been published in American Reports, traversing the fields
of theology and of law, and are worthy of careful study and
admiration. The actual decision of the case is now cited
in support of the second proposition herein, to wit, a consideration of doctrines by a court of high standing.
The point determined, tersely stated, was that by the law
of New Hampshire, upon a most exhaustive review, a corporation under the name of "The First Unitarian Society
of Christians in Dover" for which, eo nomine, a meetinghouse had been built, could not hire, employ, allow, suffer
or permit any person to preach and inculcate in the meetinghouse of said society doctrines subversive of the fundamental
principles of Christianity as generally received and held by
the denomination known as Unitarians. (The decree expresses this position fully in its various paragraphs.)
In the syllabus the statement is made that deists, theists,
free religionists and other infidels, though they may be
Unitarians in some sense, are not Unitarian Christians.
The attitude of Judge Doe in his dissent is in marked contrast with that of Lord Davey in the Scottish Church case
(Assembly v. Overtoun et al., supra, p. 645), who said: "I
appreciate, and if I may properly say so, I sympathize with
the effort made by men of great intelligence and sound learning to escape from the fetters forged by an earlier generation. But sitting on an appeal from a Court of Law, I am
not at liberty to take any such matter into consideration."
Princetonv. Adams, io Cushing 129 (1852). A legacy
to a church and society "so long as they maintain their
present essential doctrines of faith and practice," which were
then Unitarian, was forfeited by a change to a Trinitarian
system of faith and practice.
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Metcalf, J. " * * Now it is impossible for us to adopt the suggestion made in argument, that these two systems of belief are the
same essential doctrines and principles of faith and practice, or to
suppose that the testator so regarded them. He was a Unitarian and
meant to assist in the teaching of his own faith and not another. And
we know of no school either of theology or of jurisprudence in which
these two systems of faith were ever considered essentially the same.
From the early days of Christianity they have always been deemed,
as they have been in our day, antagonistic systems. And courts have
decided that funds given to support the teaching of one of them, are
misemployed and perverted when applied to support the teaching
of the other, and have redressed such misemployment" Citing Attor-

ney General v. Pearson, 3 Meri. 353; Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & Fin.
355; Attorney General v. Shore, ii Simons 592 and x6 Simons, 21o, etc.
In Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361 (1896), McCabe, J., at p. 4o9, copies
from a prior opinion: "And again, in Lamb v. Cain, 129 Ind. 5io, this
court further answered the question thus: 'Where it is alleged, in a
cause properly pending, that property thus dedicated is being diverted
from the use intended by the donor, by teaching a doctrine different
from that contemplated at the time the donation was made, however
delicate and difficult it may be, it is the duty of the court to inquire
whether the party accused of violating the trust is teaching a doctrine
so far at variance with that intended as to defeat the objects of the
trust, and if the charge is found true, to make such orders in the
premises as will secure a faithful execution of the trust confided.
Watson v. Jones, supra; Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492; Attorney
General v. Pearson, 3 Meri. 353; Watkins v. Wilcox, 66 N. Y. 654;
Attorney General v. Town of Dublin, 38 N. H. 459; Happy v. Morton,
33 Ill. '398; Fadness v. Braunborg, 73 Wis. 257."

This paragraph from the opinion of Justice Cassoday in
Fadnessv. Braunborg,73 Wis. 257, at p. 293, well sums up
the principle of the great majority of cases:
"Courts deal with tangible rights not with spiritual conceptions
unless they are incidentally and necessarily involved in the determination of legal rights. Such trusts when valid and so ascertained
must be enforced; but to call for equitable interference there must be
such a real and substantial departure from the designated faith and

doctrine as will be in contravention of such trusts. Miller v. Gable,
2 Denio, 492; Happy v. Morton, 33 Ill. 398; Lawson v. Kolbenson, 61

Ill. 405; Attorney General ex rel Abbot v. Town of Dublin, 38 N. H.
459; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Eggleston v. Doolittle, 33 Conn.
396; Keyser v. Sansifer, 6 Ohio St. 363."

See, Cape v. Plymouth Church, I1 7 Wis. at pp. 155, 156.
The effect of name and organization.
This is given in a few words by Sargeant, J., in Hale v.
Everett, 53 N. H., supra, at p. 81: "Difference in creed or
2.

27
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belief of the Christian doctrines makes the different Christian sects; difference in namte makes the different denominations, and the name usually indicates or describes the sect."
When the trust was for "a temple for the worship of
Almighty God, after the order of the Reformed Dutch
Church of North America," it was held a violation to sever
the denominational relation by a union with the Presbyterian
Church, though the doctrinal belief continued identical;
and further the prior acquiescence of the plaintiffs in the suit
in the union did not estop them from subsequently bringing
a bill in equity to maintain the trust. Jones v. Wadsworth,
4W. N. C. 514 (1877), affirming S. C. ii Phila. 227. See
Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal. 365, Trustees of First Cong.
Church v. Stewart, 43 Ill. 81 (1867), Finley v. Brent, 87
Va. 103 (i89o).
This point, however, may be passed briefly in view of
what Judge Sharswood said in the oft-cited case of Roshi's
Appeal, 69 Pa. 462 (1871).

His opinion (on p. 468) covers

the third proposition of the present essay, thus:
"The principle which governs in all such cases is old and well settled,
and has been frequently asserted by this court. Whenever a church or
religious society has been originally endowed in connection with, or
subordination to, some ecclesiastical organization and form of church
government, it can no more unite with some other organization, or become independent, than it can renounce its faith or doctrine, and adopt
others. Indeed, in many churches, its ecclesiasticism or form of church
government is an important if not a fundamental point of doctrine. It
is based, in their view, upon a scriptural model or teaching. Thus government by diocesan bishops, and the three orders of the ministrybishops, priests and deacons-is part of the doctrine as well as the
order of the Established Church of England, and her daughter, the
Episcopal Church of this country. On the other hand, the Established
Church of Scotland, and, for the most part, the reformed churches of
the continent of Europe, and all those who have derived their succession from them, hold to the doctrine of the perfect parity of ministers,
and government by Presbyteries or Classes and Synods."

4. It follows from the foregoing principles that when
in any particular church there is a breach or schism that
party which adheres to the original doctrines, usages and
government,--in other words, those who maintain the
trusts, will be sustained in the event of a suit. In addition
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to the cases hereinbefore named some others may be cited
in support of this view.
In Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ v. Church of
Christ, 6o Fed. 937, in the opinion of Philips, District Judge
(Circuit Court W. D. Missouri), at p. 953, there is the
following statement:
"In case of disorganization and factional divisions of an ecclesiastical body, the settled rule of the civil courts is that 'the title to church
property * * * is in that part of it which is acting in harmony with
its own law, and the ecclesiastical laws and usages, customs and principles, which were accepted among them before the dispute began, and
the standards for determining which party is right.' The right of
ownership abides with that faction, great or small, which is 'in favor
of the government of the church in operation with which it was connected at the time the trust -was declared.' McRoberts v. Moudy, ig
Mo. app. 26; Roshi's Appeal, 69 Pa. 462; Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488;
White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends v. White Lick Quarterly
Meeting of Friends, 89 Ind. x36."

The court also cited Judge Strong's lecture on Relation
of Civil Law to Church Property, pp. 49, 5o,* and the
opinion of Justice Caton in Ferrariav. Vasconcellos, 31
Ill. 54,,55This epitome of the rule in Pennsylvania is to be found
in Krecker v. Shirey, 163 Pa. 534 (1894) in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Williams on page 551: "The title to the
church property of a congregation that is divided is in that
part of the congregation that is in harmony with its own
*laws, usages and customs as accepted by the body before the
division took place, and who adhere to the regular organization. McGinnis v. Watson et al., 41 Pa. 9; McAuley's
Appeal, 77 Pa. 397; Landis's Appeal, 1O2 Pa. 467." Other
cases in Pennsylvania are to the same effect,-e.g., Bose v.
Christ, 193 Pa. 13 (1899); Greek Church v. Greek Church,
195 Pa. 425 (19o0).
See, also, further, among many in different states, these,
viz.: Methodist Episcopal Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio 283
(1831); Venable v. Cofftnan, 2 W. Va. 310 (1867);
. ves v. Walker, 8 Baxter's Tenn. 277 (1874); Rottmann
Bartling, 22 Neb. 375 (1887).
* I regret that I have not been able to see a copy of Judge Strong's
lecture.-J. W. P.
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There are cases in opposition to the foregoing propositions,--e.g., a number in New York, including Robertson
v. Bullions, ii N. Y. (I Kernan) 343; Petty v. Tooker,
21 N. Y. 267; Burrel v. A. R. Church, 44 Barb. 282;
but these have been repeatedly ignored in other states upon
the ground that they were based upon the provisions of the
statute of New York in relation to religious corporations.
See, Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. at p. 74; Smith v. Pedigo,
145 Ind. pp. 399, 401.

See also Baxter v.' McDonnell, 155

N. Y. 84.*
The contrary view is also independently and forcibly
expressed in the opinion of Williams, C. J., in Smith v.
Williams, 18 Vt. 511 (1846), a case which it may be said
stands almost alone. He said, at page 554:
" It could not, however, be tolerated in this country, to adopt to their
extent, the principles laid down in the case of Attorney General v.
Pearson,3 Meri.411 and 7 Sim, 29o, or the principles laid down by the
Chancellor, Lord Lyndhurst, in Attorney General v. Shore, in a note to
the latter case. The answer of the defendants in the former case contains reasons much more satisfactory, to my mind, than the opinion of
Lord Cottenham or Lord Lyndhurst. No satisfactory answer was,
or has been, given to the inquiry propounded by the counsel in that case
that, if the chancellor could decree what doctrine should not be taught,
he might, with equal propriety, declare what doctrine should be taught.
I apprehend it would not be a question of easy solution, on the doctrine
of those cases, to determine what deviations from the creed of a founder
of a charity for religious uses should be considered a violation of the
trust. Most religious societies have been, at times, divided on questions
arising out of their articles of faith, and have altered them in many
particulars, by some deemed unessential, and by others essential. The
situation of our country, our constitutional provisions in relation to
religious freedom, forbid that the authority of those cases should be
here recognized."

This is persuasive, but if it be the duty of courts to see
that trusts are performed, and not nullified, it might well
become necessary to decide affirmatively what shall be
taught, as it has been in so many instances to decide negatively what shall not be taught. The difficulty of ascertaining doctrines cannot affect the obligation to make such an
* It seems that a change was made in New York by Acts of 1875 and
z876 which deprived the congregation as well as the trustees of a religious body of the power to divert the church property from the promotion and dissemination of the religious views of the persons obtaining
and acquiring it to the promulgation and maintenance of any different
system of religious belief. See Isham v. Trustees, 63 Howard's N. Y.
Prac. 465.
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attempt, any more than the difficulty of determining questions of contingent remainders or executory devises, or other
abstruse legal problems, will excuse a judge from giving
intense study and his best conclusion. Many legal contests
are ended by a "last guess " of the highest courts.
Compare the opinion of Judge Sharswood in Schnorr's
Appeal, 67 Pa. 138, at p. 146, which begins with these
words:
"cWhen property, real or personal, is vested in a religious society,
whether incorporated or not, as a church or congregation for the wor-

ship of Almighty God and the promotion of piety and godly living, it
iu a charitable use whether the donors be one or many.'

Referring to the opinion of C. J. Lowrie in the case of
McGinnis v. Watson; 5 Wright 9, as entirely extrajudicial
and quoting it to the effect that a congregation may change
a material part of its principles or practices without forfeiting its property, on the ground that to deny this would be
imposing a law upon all churches that is contrary to the very
nature of all intellectual and spiritual life, and because the
guarantee of freedom to religion forbids us to understand
the rule in this way, Judge Sharswood said:
"I ask leave most respectfully to enter against it my dissent and
protest. * * * Courts which have the supervision and control of all
corporations and unincorporated societies or associations, must be
guided by surer and clearer principles than those to be derived from
the nature of intellectual and spiritual life. The guarantee of religious
freedom has nothing to do with the property.

It does not guarantee

freedom to steal churches.* It secures to individuals the right of
withdrawing, forming a new society, with such creed and government

as they please, raising from their own means another fund and building another house of worship; but it does not confer upon them the
right of taking the property consecrated to other uses by those who may

now be sleeping in their graves. The law of intellectual and spiritual
life is not the higher law, but must yield to the law of the land!'

This division of the relation of civil courts to religious
bodies has required an examination of many authorities
and it is believed that a sufficient number has been selected
to show the validity of the alleged jurisdiction in cases
of trusts.
A second division,--i.e., where no trust is involved,
requires less lengthy consideration.
* Not italicized in original.
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The first proposition is at hand, formulated in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Miller in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679
(1871). This case is notable for several reasons. The
differences between the parties were not in religious but in
political beliefs. The reporter, Mr. Wallace, gives an
unusually long statement of the facts, and the briefs of
counsel are full and able. The opinion is marked by the
classification of the questions in controversy in the civil
courts regarding property rights under three general heads
and these are referred to in support of rulings by courts
(both Federal and State) in almost numberless subsequent
cases. All these features have combined to make this decision of the Supreme Court of the United States conspicuous
and indeed the leading American case.
The first class found in the opinion has been noticed under
the head of trusts, supra. The second class of Justice Miller
is this: When the property is held by a, religious body which
by the nature of its organization is strictly independent of
other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any
higher authority. He said, at p. 725:
"In such case where there is a schism which leads to a separation
into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use
of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which
govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such
cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members
must control the right to the use of the property. If there be within the
congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such control,
then those who adhere to the acknowledged organism by which the body
is governed are entitled to the use of the property. The minority in
choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to
recognize the authority of the governing body, can claim no rights in
the property from the fact that they had once been members of the
church or congregation. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the
existing religious opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular
organization; for, if such was permitted, a very small minority, without
any officers of the church among them, might be found to be the only
"
faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of the founders of
church. There being no such trust imposed upon the property when
purchased or given, the court will not imply one for the purpose of
expelling from its use those who by regular succession and order constitute the church, because they have changed in some respects their
views of religious truth."

The cases of Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253, "where
the principle is ably supported by the learned Chief Justice
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of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky," and Smith v. Nelson,
I8 Vt. 5i I, are cited by Justice Miller.
This turns on the question of the independence of the
religious bodyi-" if it owes no fealty." It is in accord
with the principle of C. J. Gibson's opinion in The Presbyterian Church v. Johnston, I W. & S. 9 (1841) and expressed in the Pennsylvania decisions that followed,-e.g.,
the statement of Judge Williams in Krecker v. Shirey, 163
Pa. 534 (1894) at p. 551: "An independent congregation
may be governed by the majority of its own membership,
but a congregation connected with any given denomination
must submit to the system of discipline peculiar to the body
with which it is connected. Ehrenfeldt's Appeal, ioI Pa.
186; Fernstleret al. v. Seibert et al., 114 Pa. 196."
The theorem laid down seems self evident; but it also
appears that the fact must be that the property in such a case
must not be derived from donations, subscriptions or other
sources given or paid for the maintenance of worship, faith,
teachings and discipline in some way expressly, (or by binding iinplication), the creation of a trust. If there be no
allegiance to any other religious body or higher ecclesiastical
authority and no trust, a purely voluntary, self-governing
association or corporation may change its name or form of
government or creed or interpretation of doctrines by the
action of the majority, provided the general rules of law
which apply to all voluntary associations are n'ot infringed.
It is interesting at this place to notice in the opinion
of McCabe, J., in Smith v. Pedigo, supra, at p. 385, when a
majority of an independent church had received an unfavorable decision from the Danville Association, a council of
Baptist churches, that even if such action of the association
were purely advisory and not judicatory,"yet, as both parties submitted their claim to it, on their own statement
and version of the controversy, seeking its recognition, the decision
of the association is entitled to very great weight as to which faction is
the real and true Mount Tabor Church, and while not conclusive upon
the courts, its decision, composed as it was of delegates, called messengers, from the whole twenty-two churches composing the association, a
majority of whom in council had decided the same way, would be a
safer guide for the civil courts on questions of religious doctrine,
discipline, faith and practice than any judgment we might form contrary thereto?'
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The supporting cases cited were Mount Zion Baptist
Church et al. v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138; Harrison v.
Hoyle, 24 Ohio 254.

The next sub-division concerning rights to property is
considered in Watson v. Jones at page 722. It is "where
the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the
property is but a subordinate member of some general church
organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more
or less complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole
membership of that general organization." At page 727
the conclusion is given: "In this class of cases we think
the rule of action which should govern the civil courts,
founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church
and state under our system of laws, and supported by a
preponderating weight of judicial authority, is, that whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and
as binding on them, in their application to the case before
them." At this point Justice Miller discusses the different
rule in the English courts in cases of heresy and ecclesiastical
contumacy, and he dissents in this regard from the views
of Lord Eldon in Attorney General v. Pearson, supra, and
in Craigdalliev. Aikman, 2 Bligh. 523.
The general question suggested is, can the civil tribunals
in America interfere with what is really ecclesiastical administration? The late Judge Redfield wrote much on this
question. His notes will be found in Gartin v. Penick,
AM. LAW REG. Vol. 9, N. S. pp. 210, 225; in Chase v.
Cheney, Vol. 10, pp. 295, 313; in Watson v. Jones, Vol.
ii, pp. 43o , 457, and in Hennessy v. Walsh, Vol. 24, pp.
276, 282. Together they constitute a lengthy and able discussion, written with the sincerity and clearness (and at
times positiveness), which characterized the author. His
essays, for they go far beyond the customary memoranda of
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the annotator, are instructive. To fail to mention them
would be to omit an important duty on the part of one who
even attempts to outline the law bearing on the present
topic. In 24 AM. LAw REG. p. 277, Judge Redfield thus
summarizes:
"I . The decisions of ecclesiastical courts (or officers) having by
the rules or laws of the bodies to which they belong, jurisdiction of
such questions, or the right to decide them, will be held conclusive in
all courts of the civil administration, and no question involved in such
decisions will be revised or reviewed in the civil courts except those
pertaining to the jurisdiction of such courts or officers to determine
such questions according to the law or usage of the bodies which they
represent. 2. It is a universal rule of law, applicable not only to this
subject, but to all subjects connected with legal administration, that one
who becomes a member of any church or other society thereby consents to be governed by the rules, or laws, of such organization, and
that he cannot justly claim to have suffered wrong or injury by the enforcement of such rules upon himself or his property, upon the maxim,
volenti non fit iniuria. And this maxim applies to cases when the
party voluntarily places himself in a position ultimately to have an act
done affecting his interests, or done at the will of another, as if he subjected himself directly and immediately to the act; upon the principle
that one who puts the slowest agencies at work, which are sure in the
end to produce a given result, is as truly the author of the ultimate
result as if produced by ever so immediate and direct causes. 3. That
the courts will not interfere with the internal policy and discipline of
churches or other voluntary societies, so long as they keep within the
reasonable application of their own rules, which were known to the
members, or might have been learned by them upon reasonable inquiry
at the time of connecting themselves with the society or church."

The foregoing extract is quoted by Mr. Justice Trunkey
in the opinion in Stack v. O'Hara,98 Pa. 213 (i88i) at p.
234. This was a case in which it appeared that a bishop
of the Catholic Church removed the plaintiff, a priest of the
church, from his congregation and forbade him to exercise
his priestly functions. In an action to recover from the
bishop damages for being deprived of his living, it was
shown that by the law of the Catholic Church a bishop might
remove a priest at pleasure and without trial. The plaintiff's contention was that the defendant's action was opposed
to the law of the land and invalid. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the
defendant.
In Irvine v. Elliott, 206 Pa. 152 (igo3) the suit was
brought- by a priest of the Protestant Episcopal Church
against several defendants, including the bishop of the
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diocese, for alleged conspiracy to have the plaintiff (I)
deposed from the ministry and (2) to injure his reputation
and standing as a Christian minister and for supporting
these charges in a trial in an ecclesiastical court which rendered judgment against the plaintiff on whom sentence was
accordingly pronounced by the bishop. Per cur. opinion,
p-154,
"* * * This court, as we have said time and again, is not a court
of review of the proceedings of ecclesiastical courts. As remarked in
German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282, 'civil courts, if they
would be so unwise as to attempt to supervise the judgments of
church courts, or matters which come within their jurisdiction, would
only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would
do anything but improve either religion or good morals.' Also see
McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. g, Stack v. O'Hara, 98 Pa. 213 and Tuigg
v. Sheehan, ior Pa. 363."

Observe the qualification, " within their jurisdiction."
The applications of the rule in the third class of Watson v.
Jones, and its extensions, are so numerous that it is a pleasure to be able to refer to the long and instructive note in
ioo Am. State Rep. 734 (Oct. 1903), to the case of Morris
Street Baptist Church v. Dart, (67 So. Carolina 338), which
the writer of the present article did not read until he had
proceeded as far as this stage of his examination of authorities. The citations in the note seem to cover the various
contingencies that may be called by the term "ecclesiastical
administration." They are included under the first part of
this valuable digest thus: I. Jurisdiction when property or
civil rights involved, (a) expulsion of members; (b) expulsion of pastors. The note well supplies all needed
decisions.
Only one more, and that a celebrated one, will be given.
It is Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509 (187). Mr. Justice
Thornton (at p. 537) said: " The civil courts will interfere
with churches or religious associations when rights of property or civil rights are involved. But they will not revise
the divisions of such associations upon ecclesiastical matters
merely to ascertain their jurisdiction." And, on page 540:
"This case may then be briefly summed up. A rector in the church
is charged with nonconformity to its doctrines; intentional omissions
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in the ministration of its ordinances; and the attempt is made to
organize a court composed of his brother clergymen for his trial. He
appeals to the civil court and alleges as the chief reason for its interposition the want of authority in the spiritual court to try him and a
misconstruction of the canons. The same point was made to that court
and its power denied. It was urged with the same earnestness and
enforced with the same arguments there as here. That court overruled the objection and decided that it had jurisdiction. Five intelligent
clergymen of the church, presumed to be deeply versed in biblical and
canonical lore, were more competent than this court to decide the
peculiar questions raised. Why should we review that, and not every
pther decision, which involves the interpretation of the canons? It is
conceded that when jurisdiction attaches, the judgment of the church
court is conclusive as to purely ecclesiastical offences. It should be
equally conclusive upon doubtful and technical questions involving a
criticism of the canons, even though they might comprise jurisdictional
facts."

Chief Justice Lawrence and Justice Sheldon concurred in
the decision (reversing the lower court), but dissented from
one principle in the opinion. They assigned (p. 542) as
the reason for not revising by the secular courts the spiritual

administration by a spiritual court"that the association is purely voluntary, and that when a person
joins it he consents, that for all spiritual offences, he will be tried by a
tribunal organized in conformity with the laws of the society. But he
has not consented that he will be tried by one not so organized, and
when a clergyman is in danger of being degraded from his office and
losing his salary and means of livelihood by the action of a spiritual
court, unlawfully constituted, we are very clearly of opinion he may
come to the secular courts for protection. It would be the duty of
such courts to examine the question of jurisdiction, without regard to
the decision of the spiritual court itself, and if they find such tribunal
has been organized in defiance of the. laws of the association, and is
exercising a merely usurped and arbitrary power, they should furnish
such protection as the laws of the land will give. We consider this position clearly sustainable upon principle and authority"

This case is the subject of a long commentary by Judge
Redfield (io AM. LAw REG. N. S. 308), and a further
learned note by Hon. Melville W. Fuller (now Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court), who was counsel for
the defendant in error. The analogy of "the case of a reference or arbitration" or of a foreign judgment is invoked,
-e.g., that awards will be set aside when ultra vires; that
the foreign court has no jurisdiction; that the party was
not served with process or that the same was fraudulently
obtained. The long and earnest arguments in these notes
and Judge Redfield's prior and subsequent ones (see volumes
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of Am. LAW REG. cited supra), may be deemed to support

the dissent in Chase v. Cheney. Among other authorities,
Mr. Fuller quotes, p. 315, some sentences from the opinion
in an intense and deplorable controversy, (now happily only
a matter of history because of a wise and righteous reunion),
between the Old School and New School divisions of the
Presbyterian Church,
"The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Green,
4 Whart. 603, in reviewing the proceedings of the Presbyterian General

Assembly says: 'We have, as already remarked, no authority to
rejudge its judgments on their merits. * * * We are to determine
only what was done; the reasons of those who did it are immaterial.
If the acts complained of were within the jurisdiction of the Assembly,
their decision must be final, though they decided wrong.' And again:
'Had the excluded synods been cut off by a judicial sentence, without
hearing or notice, the act would have been contrary to the cardinal
principles of natural justice, and consequently void.' And the same
court in Green v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, i S. & R. 254,
restored the relator to his 'standing' as a member, overruling the
action of the society in that regard."

This further distinction is made by Taft, J., in Brundage
v.Deardorf, 55 Fed. 839, when he says (p. 847):
"Even if the supreme judicatory has the right to construe the
limitations of its own power, and the civil courts may not interfere
with such a construction, and must take it as conclusive, we do not
understand the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones to hold that an open
and avowed defiance of the original compact, and an express violation
of it, will be taken as a decision of the supreme judicatory which is
binding on the civil courts."

Certainly, the effect of Watson v. Jones cannot be
extended beyond the principle that a bona fide decision of
the fundamental law of the church must be recognized as
conclusive by civil courts.*
Wallace v. Trustees, 194 Pa. 178 (1897)

and S. C. as

Wallace v. Presbyterian Church, Appellants, 2Ol Pa. 292
(1902), may be deemed singular in its course of proceedings. The history of the case is related by Judge Dean and
is as follows: In 1892 the presbytery of which the Jamestown, Mercer County, Congregation is a member dissolved
* An extreme instance in a case of excommunicated members may be
found in Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303. See note r5 L R. A. 8oi.
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the pastoral relation between the latter and its pastor, Rev.
J. R. Wallace, upon charges preferred before the presbytery
by eight members of the congregation, mainly that he was
contumacious and treated the church court of session with
the utmost disrespect; there was no charge of immorality
or neglect of pastoral work. On his complaint of injustice
there was a review by the synod, a higher ecclesiastical
court; the synod reversed the action of the presbytery.
The presbytery then appealed to the General Assembly of
the United Presbyterian Church, the church court of last
resort, which court in 1893 reversed the action of the synod.
The plaintiff then filed his bill in the court of common pleas
of Allegheny County, averring that he had been removed
from his pastorate without just cause and that the proceedings in the church courts by which he had been removed
were not in accordance with the law of the church, that the
whole proceeding subsequent to the action of the synod was
arbitrary, illegal and void, because in direct violation of the
laws and usages of the church; and that he had been wrongfully deprived of his salary, had been injured in his standing
and reputation as a Christian teacher and excluded from the
reasonable exercise of the profession by which he lived.
The trustees of the General Assembly were made defendants
and filed a special answer, in substance denying that they
were answerable for the acts complained of. The court
below sustained this answer and dismissed the plaintiff's
bill. He appealed to the Supreme Court from this decree
and it was reversed. The opinion of the court by Mr.
Justice Dean (on p. i8o of 194 Pa.) thus treats the question
of jurisdiction:
"Unquestionably, if the averments of the bill be sustained a court of
equity has jurisdiction. No question of faith or doctrine of which the
ecclesiastical courts of his church have sole jurisdiction is involved.
It is simply whether plaintiff has been illegally deprived of his rights of
property. If, in violation of its own laws, the church has ousted him
from his pulpit and in effect wrongly deprived him of his living, he can
have recourse to the civil courts for restoration of his rights. A church
cannot illegally wrest from its servants their property, any more than
can an individual. 'When rights of property are in question, civil
courts will inquire whether the organic rules and forms of proceeding
prescribed *by the ecclesiastical body have been followed:' O'Hara v.
Stack, go Pa. 477. The plaintiff's averments, that, in violation of the
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laws of the church, he has been deprived of his property are not denied;
whether they are well founded is a question on which we pass no opinion; the time for such opinion is after adjudication and decree in the
court below."

(The judge then discusses the question whether these
were proper parties defendants, which is aside from the
present purpose.)
The Common Pleas, Stowe, J., subsequently found as a
fact that there were irregularities in the proceedings of the
General Assembly which rendered the decision of the latter
null and void. (These are specified in the opinion of the
Supreme Court, p. 296.) There was a decree reversing
the action of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, declaring it null and void, and restoring the
plaintiff to the position of pastor. This was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
It may be averred with "confidence" (usually a foolish
word in legal opinions), that in the case of a judgment by
any court a fatal defect is the want of jurisdiction in the
court which has entered such judgment. Take a marked
illustration: The first section of the fourth article of the
Constitution of the United States provides that "full faith
and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And
the congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in
which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof." The Act of Congress of 179o,
Rev. St. §9o5, was enacted for such authentication. Mr.
Justice Bradley said in Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall.
457, upon a review of previous cases, that "the jurisdiction
of the court by which a judgment is rendered in any state
may be questioned in a collateral proceeding in another
state," notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution
and law of 179o, and the averments contained in the record
itself. This doctrine has been repeatedly affirmed.
In a controversy of a different sort, which has excited
much public interest, Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562,
(decided April 12, 19o6, four justices dissenting), Mr.
Justice White, pp. 572 and 573, stated the question:
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"Is a proceeding for divorce of such an exceptional character as not
to come within the rule limiting the authority of a State to persons
within its jurisdiction, but on the contrary, because of the power
which government may exercise over the marriage relation constitutes
an exception to that rule * * ?
"Before reviewing the authorities relied on to establish that a divorce
is of the exceptional nature indicated, we propose first to consider the
reasons advanced to sustain the contention. In doing so, however, it
must always be borne in mind that it is elementary, that when the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution is invoked to compel the
enforcement in one State of a decree rendered in another, the question
of the jurisdiction of the court by which the decree was rendered is
op4n to inquiry. And if there was no jurisdiction, either of the subject
matter or of the person of the defendant, the courts of another State
are not required by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution to enforce such decree. National Exchange Bank v.
Wiley, i95 U. S. 257, 269 and cases cited."

It is submitted that, a fortiori, the jurisdiction of an
ecclesiastical court may be examined by a secular court;
for if no jurisdiction exist, the proceedings are coram non
judice.

This event in Hebrew history is recalled"And Jephthah said unto them, I and my people were at great
strife with the children of Ammon; and when I called you, ye
delivered me not out of their hands. And when I saw that ye delivered
me not, I put life in my hands, and passed over against the children
of Ammon, and the Lord delivered them into my hand: wherefore
then are ye come up unto me this day, to fight against me? Then
Jephthah gathered together all the men of Gilead, and fought with
Ephraim; and the men of Gilead smote Ephraim, because they
said, Ye Gileadites are fugitives of Ephraim among the Ephraimites,
and among the Manassites. And the Gileadites took the passages of
Jordan before the Ephraimites: and it was so, that when those
Ephraimites which were escaped said, Let me go over; that the men
of Gilead said unto him, Art thou an Ephraimite? If he said, Nay;
Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth:
for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him,
and slew him at the passages of Jordan." (Judges 12: 2-7.)

To us who enjoy civil and religious liberty, the punishment seems cruel, but in the thought of the warriors who
had come from the heat of the battle for a cause deemed
righteous the password and the penalty were doubtless justifiable. Yet "Shibboleth" has been adopted as an opprobrious term for all narrow, hard, illiberal orthodoxy, intol-
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erance, oppression and persecuting zeal. In our own age
and country no religious password is necessary. The law
will not permit a compulsory "advance and give the countersign," with a fatal alternative.
Consider some of the varied thoughts of men on the
subject of Deity.
A mighty thinker, an educator and benefactor in many
ways, ends his reasoning with emptiness, with the "Unknowable." A great scientist, original-and profound, professes no cognizance of God, or soul or immortality; his
affirmation is a negation; he knows only that on these
topics he knows nothing.
A writer, learned, lucid, philosophical, may assert "that
the things and events of the world do not exist or occur
blindly or irrelevantly, but that all, from the beginning to
the end of time, and throughout the furthest sweep of illimitable space, are connected together as the orderly manifestations of a divine Power, and that this divine Power is something outside of ourselves, and upon it our existence from
moment to moment depends." And further, "Matthew
Arnold once summed, up these two propositions very well
when he defined God as 'an eternal power that makes for
righteousness.'." And yet the writer of the words just
quoted might formulate no other creed, nor adhere to or
uphold any church.
Other men are sceptics,-avowed, boastful, insistent.
Turning from all these differences and shades of thought,
we find a multitude of men of all sorts and conditions,
learned and unlearned, of many names and not at absolute
agreement with each other in some points, (essentials, or
non-essentials, perhaps), but all concurring in certain
grounds of faith. They are in accord, for instance, in
affirming that there is a God and that he is a being of infinite
wisdom, power and love, a father and a friend, and that
"the chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy him
forever." Each sect, it is true, has special forms of doctrine,
worship, government, that to its adherents are full of meaning; that to those who hold them, express eternal verities.
Sometimes tenets or symbols that are null and void to one
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are of precious value to another, as the tenderness of a
"voice that is still," once- dearly loved, is heard by only
one of the living in psalm or prayer or music.
Whatever these diversities may be, religion, to the sincere
believer, is an inspiration to right conduct, a solace in adversity or defeat, the consoling, nay the triumphant, "song of
the conquered;" and its record of the lives and the deaths
of prophets, martyrs and apostles, of the saints of all ages,
sublime in courage, patience, endeavor and sacrifice helps
and uplifts in present doubts, trials, sorrows or sufferings.
The two great commandments, supreme and dominant
love of God and its necessary sequence, love of our neighbor,
make the highest rule of conduct, its essence being unselfishness and beneficence. And on, and on, and on, far beyond
all known earthly needs and experiences, after the vapor
called life shall vanish, is a home, a rest, a glory passing
the conception of man.
All this, and immeasurably and unspeakably more, is
found in the teachings and the fellowships of churches,
despite the faults, the weakness and the mistakes that are
also in evidence.
Yet from each man, each set of men, whether of a church,.
or opposed to every church, or indifferent to all churches,
the civil courts, in regard to religious matters, stand apart.
Freedom, of conviction and of action, is the prerogative of
all, unless rights of property or of persons are invaded, or
trusts violated, or ecclesiastical administration is erroneously
conducted, or the law of the land is disobeyed,-for this
is America.
John W. Patton.

